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Submission to House of Lords Select Committee on Communications Inquiry: 
“The Internet: to regulate or not to regulate?” 
NINSO (The Northumbria Internet & Society Research Interest Group)1 
Summary 
1.  • An assessment of existing laws and regulatory approaches should be undertaken. Existing regulation 
should then be amended, taking an evidence-based approach • There should be consideration of online norms and the role of the law in shaping norms • Education must be a key consideration 
2.  • A tailored approach should be applied with reference to size, resources, technical means and content • Determination of liability should go beyond the ‘notice and takedown’ mechanism  • A platform should be liable where it has knowledge of unlawful content or the technical means to 
ensure legality 
3.  • Moderation processes are generally opaque • There are limited options available for individuals who disagree with a platform’s decision • Alternative systems include an online optional dispute resolution platform  • A tailored approach to platforms is required based on size and resources 
4. • Users should be responsibilised; education should be integrated as part of the online user experience • Users could establish and maintain online norms • Large organisations could consider introducing a review panel composed of independent users 
5.  • The right to privacy should also be protected by any measures introduced • Measures should be appropriate to the resources of the platform • Additional safeguards should be introduced to protect children • Education must be a key consideration 
6.  • A summary of key information should be provided followed by a detailed explanation • The method of informing users is of equal importance • Platforms must ensure a level of clarity sufficient for users to make a clear choice • The issues of power imbalance and genuine choice should be given consideration  • Education must, again, be a key consideration 
7.  • Adherence to principles of fairness, accountability, transparency, privacy and user-friendliness is 
required • The algorithm should be disclosed in full in certain circumstances 
8. • The issue of power imbalance between the user and the platform should be considered • A holistic approach should be applied 
9. • The existing jurisdictional problem of fragmentation of internet laws is likely to be worsened • The UK cannot afford a fundamental divergence from the EU position on matters including cross 
border transfer, geo-blocking and portability of digital content • Participation in relevant EU initiatives should be considered 
 
                                                      
1
 NINSO (The Northumbria Internet & Society Research Interest Group) is multidisciplinary enterprise consisting 
of researchers from law, business, social sciences, computer science, engineering, and architecture, with a 
research interest at the intersection of internet and society. For more information please see: 
https://www.northumbria.ac.uk/about-us/academic-departments/northumbria-law-school/law-research/ninso-
the-northumbria-internet-and-society-research-interest-group/  
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1. Is there a need to introduce specific regulation for the internet? Is it desirable or possible? 
1.1. The scope of this question appears to be very broad. It is considered noteworthy that the question 
asks whether it is necessary to introduce specific regulation for the ‘internet’ whilst subsequent 
questions refer to ‘online platforms’.  If the intention is to regulate ‘the internet’ then this is clearly 
more complex than regulating a specific part of the internet; very different issues are raised when 
one considers the different types of online platforms now available (for example: large social 
media entities such as Facebook, Instagram and Snapchat; sites which offer opportunities to buy 
online including Amazon, eBay; online gaming sites; dating applications; discussion forums, 
websites and social media pages operated by individuals to allow other members of a sporting 
club or village to gain information about interests of specific relevance to that group). There is no 
‘one size fits all’ answer that can be applied to all of these platforms and a tailored approach is 
necessary.  
1.2. In addition, the scope of any regulation should be considered in order to ensure a more focused 
application. In 2014/5 the HL Communications Committee report published on social media and 
criminal offences considered, at that time, that the criminal law was generally appropriate for the 
prosecution of offences committed using social media. It is therefore queried whether the 
intended scope of the current call for evidence is focused on civil regulation. This would make 
the project more manageable and seems sensible, though consideration should be given to the 
intended approach (e.g. from the standpoint of ecommerce or for the protection of individuals, or 
both).  
1.3. In answer to the question of whether it is desirable or possible to regulate the internet, it is 
submitted that the internet is already heavily regulated in the UK where there exists, for example, 
the ICO in relation to online data protection and privacy; Ofcom in respect of online streaming 
services and ASA with regard to online advertising standards. The first step should be to collect 
all existing laws and regulations and assess whether they are consistent. Secondly, one should 
try and take a holistic, evidence-based approach and amend existing laws accordingly.  
1.4. Whilst regulation should be kept to a minimum, not all regulation stifles innovation. Regulation is 
fundamental when it is industry practice to violate fundamental rights by contractual means (e.g. 
privacy and consumer protection). More evidence is needed to assess which of the following 
approaches is the ideal one: regulation, co-regulation, or self-regulation. In regulating, one should 
keep in mind the inherent jurisdictional problem; therefore, emphasis should be given to private 
international law and conventional initiatives. 
1.5. Whilst it may be appropriate to regulate some aspects, it may be less appropriate to impose strict 
rules in respect of others. Two particular issues for consideration are set out as follows: 
1.5.1. How information is used by online platforms and those who offer services via the 
internet.  
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It is arguable that this is an area which both should and could be subject to regulation. 
Whilst arguably these platforms are already subject to data protection regulation, the 
recent issues with Facebook and Cambridge Analytica suggest there is scope for greater 
regulation of the use of individual’s personal data. One particularly significant issue that 
has been identified is that there is a substantial power imbalance between users and the 
operators of online platforms. Users frequently have no capacity to moderate terms but 
instead have the ‘choice’ of accepting all terms (which might include giving away 
significant amounts of personal data) or simply not using the service.  This is not 
providing a real choice.   Alternative models are explored below at 6.3.  
1.5.2. How the rights of individuals to exercise their rights to freedom of expression are 
balanced with the rights of individuals whose information is posted online, particularly 
where that information is posted online without their knowledge or consent.  
The heavy censorship of countries, such as China and Bahrain, is not considered 
desirable.  However, it is suggested that consideration does need to be given to ensuring 
that there is effective regulation in place to enable individuals to challenge a breach of 
their right to privacy.  There are potentially difficulties in regulating the speech of 
individuals given the global nature of the internet. However, the case of PJS v 
Newsgroup Newspapers (2016) suggests that to some extent legal regulation of the 
internet can be effective even in the face of worldwide disclosures.2 The bigger issue 
here, perhaps, is not, however, a lack of regulation. As noted above data protection 
regulation already exists. As the Information Commissioner has made clear, however, 
they will not consider complaints made by individuals against other individuals who have 
posted information online in a personal capacity. This is at odds with the approach in 
many other European countries.3  It is, however, a pragmatic response to limited 
resources.4  By contrast, recent empirical research, whereby a group of 45 parents were 
asked about their knowledge and understanding of the law and how it could be used to 
protect their family’s privacy suggests that many individuals already believe that 
regulations exist which would allow them to request the deletion of online posts which 
they have not consented to. 
1.6. Reference is made in the call to the comments in the Government’s Internet Safety Strategy 
that ‘what is unacceptable offline should be unacceptable online’.   This is not disputed. What 
                                                      
2 PJS v Newsgroup Newspapers [2016] UKSC 26 
3 See: David Erdos ‘Beyond having a domestic: Regulatory interpretation of European Data Protection Law 
and Individual Publication’ Computer Law and Security Review (2017) 33(3) 275-297 
4 See: ICO, Social Networking and Online Forums – When does the DPA apply? https://ico.org.uk/media/for-
organisations/documents/1600/social-networking-and-online-forums-dpa-guidance.pdf [accessed 4 May 
2018]; and  
The Law Society and others v Rick Kordowski [2011] EWHC 3185 (QB)) 
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needs to be considered, however, is whether, in fact, in some situations, a greater level of 
regulation is needed in the online sphere than in the offline sphere.  In interviews with parents, 
a significant number of parents expressed concern that the impact of online disclosure is 
significantly greater and longer lasting than offline disclosure.  It was clear from these 
interviews that what some individuals find unacceptable online they may in fact consider to 
be acceptable (or treat as mere gossip) offline.  By contrast, however, some individuals, who 
are regular users of online platforms may be happier for information to be disclosed online.   
The extent of technology use, the extent to which users trust those with whom they associate 
online, age of users, anonymity of platforms etc. are all relevant to individuals’ views.  So 
many people use the internet in so many different ways it may be difficult to establish a ‘norm’. 
1.7. Before any decision can be made about regulation, therefore, careful consideration needs to 
be given to what online ‘norms’ are and the role that the law plays in shaping norms.  As 
noted above many individuals believe that they should be able to control what information is 
posted about them online; they understand that they already have a right to redress where 
posts are made without consent.  There is therefore an issue not only of regulation here but 
also of providing guidance to individuals and managing expectations. 
1.8. It is submitted that one of the key concerns should be education and raising of awareness so 
that individuals have a clearer understanding of the control over personal data and possible 
redress available (especially in light of the GDPR). This is considered in more detail below at 
6. 
1.9. The importance of education also extends to the organisations which process the data, to 
which education on safe working practices, existing laws on privacy, freedoms, crime etc. 
should be provided. This could also be combined with a code of practice guided by a set of 
principles that include respecting and using personal data appropriately, making sure people 
understand the rules that apply to them when they’re online and putting in place protections 
to keep people safe online. This should also ultimately contribute to a system of compliance 
based on the key concept of ‘privacy by design’. 
 
2. What should the legal liability of online platforms be for the content that they host? 
2.1. Again, a ‘one size fits all’ solution would not be suitable for every platform and a tailored approach 
would be more appropriate taking into account the size, technical means and resources of the 
platform. A similarly tailored approach should also be applied to different content, with more 
extreme content necessitating more extreme measures.  Online platforms should be liable not 
merely for illegal contact but more generally should be liable for unlawful content i.e. posts that 
defame, breach privacy laws including the provisions of the GDPR, result in nuisance of 
harassment and the violation of copyright. 
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2.2. Determination of liability should go beyond the ‘notice and takedown’ mechanism; a platform 
should be liable if it has knowledge of the unlawful content or it has the technical means and 
resources to ensure the legality of the activities carried out on the platform while striking a balance 
between the different interests involved, including freedom of expression. Platforms which de facto 
or de jure monitor users cannot invoke immunity (so-called safe harbours).  
2.3. If content is from third party sites, then it should not be the responsibility of the content provider 
platform; accountability should lie squarely on those generating the content in the first instance. As 
mentioned above, however, if content provider is aware of the inappropriate content then they 
should have the responsibility of removing content.  
2.4. Consideration should be given to issues regarding policing of sites, reduction in privacy, freedom 
of expression and information.5 Moreover, there should also be consideration of whether contract 
law at its current state is sufficient to establish liability between content providers, online 
platform/interface, host, ISP, site and app developers. Potential standardization of terms of service 
for ISPs and search engines used within a jurisdiction could provide a consistent and transparent 
system in disclosing information held/monitored and how the site will process these. The GDPR 
will be of value in this regard. 
 
3. How effective, fair and transparent are online platforms in moderating content that they 
host? What processes should be implemented for individuals who wish to reverse 
decisions to moderate content? Who should be responsible for overseeing this? 
3.1. At present, online platforms are often over-effective when it comes to intellectual property 
infringement and non-effective when it comes to other forms of content, for example in relation to 
terrorism.  
3.2. Furthermore, moderation is often opaque and one of the real issues that users face is a lack of 
guidance as to what policies online platforms operate. Even when platforms do provide an 
accessible policy it is not helpful to the ordinary individual and indeed may be considered 
misleading. As an example of this, see Facebook’s community standards page which states that 
‘you may not publish the personal information of others without their consent.’6  Many individuals 
do, of course, publish other individuals’ personal information without consent, for example when 
posting photographs.  Facebook states elsewhere that it ‘provides people with ways to report 
photos and videos that they believe to be in violation of their privacy rights. We'll remove photos 
and videos that you report as unauthorized if this is required by relevant privacy laws in your 
country.’7 Since few people know what the actual legal position is, it will not be clear to the average 
                                                      
5 See also E-Commerce Directive Art 12, 13, 14;  
Digital Content Directive; Digital Single Market; European E-Commerce Reforms 2018 
6
 Facebook Community Standards https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/ [accessed 4 May 2018] 
7
 Facebook Image Privacy Rights https://www.facebook.com/help/428478523862899 [accessed 4 May 2018] 
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individual whether or not they have a right to seek removal of a photograph and such a statement 
is not, therefore helpful. Transparency is key in this matter; however, careful consideration should 
be given to how ‘transparency’ is defined, covering what is meant by ‘effective’ and ‘fair’ in this 
context. 
3.3. In any event, whilst in principle online dissemination of an indiv idual’s personal information without 
consent might be considered to breach data protection provisions (which will of course emphasise 
the importance of consent still further from 25 May 2018) it appears that Facebook’s position on 
removal of posts is far more limited, and focuses on matters such as hate speech, incitement of 
terrorism, but not a photo of mundane activities in ordinary life8. This is perhaps understandable 
given the EU position as detailed in the European Commission’s Recommendation of 1.3.2018 on 
measures to effectively tackle illegal content online9 and the Information Commissioner’s current 
approach to the DPA and social media as detailed above at 1.5.2. 
3.4. There are of course issues with online platforms ‘self-policing’. At present there are limited options 
for individuals who disagree with the decision of a social media giant unless they have the financial 
capacity to bring court proceedings.  In terms of remedies, an online optional dispute resolution 
platform managed by a trusted independent third party should be available. This should not replace 
judicial redress. It should be recognised that most of the decisions taken in this context fall under 
the GDPR, Article 22. However, it is crucial to make sure that remedies are available also beyond 
the GDPR, e.g. when no personal data is processed or if the decision is not solely automated. A 
task force with members of the national Data Protection Authority and of the Consumer Protection 
Authorities should oversee this (though again the current stance of the ICO to the Data Protection 
Act and social media poses problems). A further alternative might be to adopt the suggestion made 
by the Children’s Commissioner to put in place a children’s digital ombudsman, to mediate between 
under 18s and social media companies, and/or to put in place a digital ombudsman to support any 
individual.10 
3.5. It must not be forgotten, of course, that there are many different types of online platforms including 
smaller platforms, for example websites operated by sporting groups or from community interest, 
which will also operate their own moderation policies. Online platforms vary widely in how they 
have been developed, their functionality and what their objectives are, and each have various 
business models for operation. Given that such groups will rarely be able to benefit from the legal 
                                                      
8
 See for example: Revealed: Facebook's internal rulebook on sex, terrorism and violence 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/may/21/revealed-facebook-internal-rulebook-sex-terrorism-violence 
[accessed 4 May 2018] 
9
 Commission Recommendation of 1.3.2018 on measures to effectively tackle illegal content online (C(2018) 
1177)  
10
 Growing Up Digital, A Report of the Growing Up Digital Taskforce (2017) 
https://www.childrenscommissioner.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Growing-Up-Digital-Taskforce-
Report-January-2017_0.pdf [accessed 4 May 2018] 
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advice available to large corporations, a tailored approach to regulation or at least guidance for 
such groups would undoubtedly be helpful. 
3.6. The agenda should be evidence-based and research-informed; therefore, academics should play 
an important role and should be consulted. 
 
4. What role should users play in establishing and maintaining online community standards 
for content and behaviour? 
4.1. Users should be reasonably responsibilised. Long, unfair, and opaque privacy policies and usage 
guidelines are not a good way to achieve this. Education and advice should become integrated as 
part of the online user experience reminding users of the privacy options available. Users should 
also be held responsible and accountable to adhere to age restrictions, publishing content that is 
appropriate/inappropriate such as photographs, messages that are libellous, offensive, illegal, 
damage to reputation, bullying and humiliating. 
4.2. In addition, it might be seen as appropriate for users to establish and maintain online community 
standards (acting together as part of a responsible community). The difficulty in the online sphere 
is that we have yet to see the establishment of norms of disclosure i.e. what it is appropriate to 
disclose online, as discussed above at 1.7.    
4.3. There is again a distinction to be made between the establishment of standards on platforms 
operated by large corporate entities and small sites. Even on smaller sites, however, significant 
differences of opinion are often evident between the moderators of such sites. On bigger sites one 
possibility that might be considered could be a review panel composed of independent users, who 
vote and report on decisions which have been appealed by a user of the site. Consideration would 
need to be given to the definition of the users appointed, the method of appointment and the steps 
that should be introduced to ensure that membership registration is a legitimate attempt to join the 
site and not merely an attempt to exert influence over standards and their enforcement. Matters 
such as diversity, bias, confidentiality and relevance should also feed into the discussion. 
 
5. What measures should online platforms adopt to ensure online safety and protect the 
rights of freedom of expression and freedom of information? 
5.1. This is a very broad question.  Online safety and freedom of information are very different issues 
and would require very different measures.  Furthermore, it is interesting that this question focuses 
on freedom of expression and freedom of information yet makes no reference to rights to privacy.  
Rights to privacy should be considered alongside and recognised to be of the same fundamental 
importance as rights to freedom of expression. 
5.2. Moreover, it is important that measures differ depending on the resources of the platform. 
Regulatory initiatives should be taken bearing in mind the risks of over-protection of certain 
interests (e.g. IP holders). In no instance, however, should platforms be allowed to invoke 
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immunities based on the lack of knowledge if they carry out forms of private surveillance e.g. for 
advertising purposes. Preventive measures should be a last resort and they should have a sound 
empirical basis. 
5.3. As noted above specific consideration needs to be given to the rights and vulnerabilities of children, 
who would benefit from the support of their own digital ombudsman.  It is suggested, however, that 
additional consideration needs to be given by large platforms to whether a user is a child and 
indeed whether a post relates to a child.   A duty of care might for example be imposed upon large 
organisations with significant resources, such as Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, Twitter, with, for 
example, privacy settings being set to respect privacy, as a default, when images or information 
relate to young children with a limitation also imposed on the extent to which information and 
images relating to that child can be copied, re-contextualised or disseminated further.  
5.4. An alternative measure, which may be easier to implement, could be to incorporate a system 
whereby a user receives a pop-up message each time information featuring an individual’s image 
is shared, which informs and reminds the user of the rights, restrictions and obligations in relation 
to data privacy. This method also strikes a balance between privacy and freedom of expression 
through the use of ‘nudges’ rather than more severe methods such as filtering, censoring or 
blocking of content. 
5.5. Clearly, the importance of educating users should be integral when incorporating the concept of 
privacy by design. 
 
6. What information should online platforms provide to users about the use of their personal 
data? 
6.1. It is important that individuals are provided with a summary of the type of data collected, the 
purposes for which every type of data is collected, how the data is processed and the third parties 
with whom the data is shared. The summary should be followed by a thorough explanation of all 
the data collected in compliance with the GDPR. Separate information is required for sensitive 
personal information, for example data regarding religious beliefs. The explanation should also 
describe the data which is provided by the individual directly, collected through use of the platform 
and inferred through further profiling and automated decision making.  
6.2. It is equally as important, however, to consider how the information is delivered to individuals. In 
line with the requirement for privacy by design, the terms of service and privacy policies must be 
clear and easy to understand. Videos and infographics are goods ways to convey complex 
information such as this. The keywords should be in bold. The text should be readable, i.e. 
coefficient 8 Flesch-Kincaid. This policy should also comply with the Unfair Terms regime. 
Ultimately, the information should be delivered with a level of clarity that is sufficient to enable 
users to make an informed choice. 
10/05/2018 9 
6.3. The concept of choice, as discussed above at 1.5.1 is an important issue which needs to be 
addressed. It is arguable whether users have a genuine choice as to whether to consent to 
processing given that, oftentimes, users are faced with the option of providing consent (which might 
include giving away significant amounts of personal data) or simply not being permitted to access 
the service, with no capacity to moderate the terms. Alternative models include:  
i. no data collection beyond collection of data needed for the user to receive the service;  
ii. default position is no data collection but data collection is possible with the user’s explicit, 
valid, fully informed consent;  
iii. data collection is possible only upon payment to the individual; or  
iv. no data collection upon payment of a premium, free service individuals agree to provide 
data (this is not a model we support since it disadvantages the marginalised. 
6.4. In any event more emphasis should again be placed on education and raising awareness of rights 
in relation to data minimisation. Again, privacy by design is an important principle in this regard.  
 
7. In what ways should online platforms be more transparent about their business practices—
for example in their use of algorithms? 
7.1. Online platforms must adhere to principles of fairness, accountability, transparency, privacy and 
user-friendliness in relation to how decisions are made and the reasoning behind decisions. Article 
22 of the GDPR can go to some lengths to determine these but not completely, particularly if 
machines are capable of self-learning. 
7.2. There are also circumstances where a technical document which includes the algorithm used and 
a mere explanation of the logic in mathematical terms will not arguably meet the legal requirement 
under Article 22 of the GDPR. For example, in the context of court proceedings which are subject 
to obligations of confidentiality, platforms should disclose the algorithms themselves if they are 
used to make decisions affecting their users, to allow users to obtain expert evidence and therefore 
ensure access to a fair trial. The GDPR should be interpreted as the disclosure of the algorithm 
with an explanation in layman’s terms about the rationale of the decision and criteria relied upon.11 
7.3. Algorithms should also be auditable and audited frequently by an independent body. 
 
8. What is the impact of the dominance of a small number of online platforms in certain online 
markets? 
8.1. The impact can be devastating. This again relates to the significant power imbalance between the 
user and the large organisation, where individuals are not able to negotiate the terms and there is 
in effect no real ‘choice’ at all. This issue should be considered in combination with the risk of ‘lock-
                                                      
11
 Guido Noto La Diega, ‘Against the Dehumanisation of Decision-Making. Algorithmic decisions at the 
crossroads of Intellectual Property, Data Protection, and Freedom of Information’ (2018) 9(3) JIPITEC 1 
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in effect’ resulting from the disproportionate level of power in the hands of the oligarchy of online 
platforms whose business models rely heavily on the valuable currency of big data. 
8.2. A holistic approach to personal data and big data, which also takes into account competition law, 
is necessary. 
 
9. What effect will the United Kingdom leaving the European Union have on the regulation of 
the internet? 
9.1. This is a question that can only realistically be answered once it is clear what shape Brexit will take 
and what steps the Government will take to ensure ongoing co-operation with Europe.  
9.2. In general, there is a real risk that leaving the EU will worsen the existing jurisdictional problem of 
fragmentation of internet laws, across IPR, ecommerce, cyber security, and competition for UK 
businesses.  
9.3. It is submitted that the UK cannot afford to have a fundamental divergence to the EU and a solution 
on cross-border data transfers, geo-blocking and on the portability of digital content must be a top 
priority. 
9.4. Consideration should also be given to whether the UK will be able to participate in relevant EU 
initiatives, for example the Cloud Computing initiative and DSM. 
